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ASSET PRICES AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS OF 2007-09:   
AN OVERVIEW OF THEORIES AND POLICIES  
 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
The recent financial crisis and consequent “Great Recession” has resulted in 
economists reconsidering the role monetary policy and financial regulation play in the 
economy. This reconsideration follows a period of time when both economists and 
economic policy makers were congratulating themselves on a job seemingly well done. 
 
In the 20 years since the disinflation of the early 1980s the U.S. economy 
experienced two long economic expansions and two mild recessions. In addition, the 
volatility of inflation and the growth rate of real GDP declined. This period, known as the 
“Great Moderation” also experienced episodes of financial instability such as the stock 
market crashes of 1987 and 2000, the S&L crisis of the 1980s, the 1994 Mexican crisis, 
the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, the 1998 LCTM bankruptcy and the 1998 Russian 
default. However these events had little impact on the real economy. The Fed focused 
largely on setting the Federal funds rate to insure maximum sustainable growth and price 
stability. The consensus for optimal monetary policy, sometimes called the “Greenspan 
doctrine” suggested that central banks respond to asset price booms asymmetrically: that 
is, do nothing during the asset price boom and then cut interest rates during the bust to 
reduce the impact on the real economy.  
 
The Greenspan policy doctrine seemed to work well in insulating the real 
economy from financial instability during the 20 years since the early 1980s. Also during 
this twenty year period the financial sector, in response to deregulation as well as 
financial innovations leading to development and marketing of new financial instruments, 
doubled in size as measured by valued added to GDP (see table 1). While the U.S. 
economy did not grow faster, the variance of output growth fell even in the face of 
episodic financial instability which perhaps was offset by appropriately timed cuts in the 
Federal funds rate. 
 
Table 1 
 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000-2008 
Growth rate real 
GDP 
4.5% 3.2% 3.0% 3.1% 2.3% 
Standard Deviation 
of growth rate of 
real GDP 
1.6% 2.5% 2.5% 1.5% 1.1% 
Value added of 
financial sector as 
a share of GDP 
4.0% 4.6% 6.0% 7.3% 8.4% 
 
In explaining the “Great Moderation” of the business cycle since the disinflation 
of the 1980s some economists, most prominently Bernanke (2004) cited financial 
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innovation and appropriate monetary policies as two key causal factors. Financial 
innovation was believed to improve the performance of the economy by allocating capital 
and risk more efficiently. Monetary policy by appropriately timed cuts in interest rates 
was thought to have offset financial shocks, resulting in long economic expansions and 
mild recessions. Hence prior to the financial crisis of 2007-2009, the economic consensus 
among central bankers and many academics was that monetary policy was working, 
maybe even fine tuning the economy while financial innovations were resulting in a more 
efficient allocation of capital.  
 
In retrospect, given the financial crisis of 2007-2008 and the resulting 2
nd
 Great 
Contraction, these explanations have lost, at least, some force. Ironically two commonly 
cited causes of the recent financial crisis and recession are monetary policy and financial 
innovation. Hence both the appropriate role of monetary policy and financial innovation 
are currently being rethought by economists. For monetary policy the asymmetric 
approach to asset price booms, which had been widely endorsed by central bankers is 
now being reconsidered, particularly for financial sector financed asset price booms such 
as in real estate. Financial innovation is also being reconsidered with an eye toward new 
regulation. 
        
 The rest of this paper is organized as follows: the next section discusses the 
general characteristics of financial crises along with various theories that have been 
development in an attempt to understand them. Then the recent financial crisis of 2007-
09 is reviewed, followed by a discussion of what new policies may reduce the frequency 
of financial crises and their impact on the real economy. 
 
2. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF FINANCIAL CRISES 
Financial crises are a recurring phenomenon across countries and throughout 
history. Crises can be thought of as having three parts: 1) initial causal factors setting up, 
2) an asset price bubble and bust with implications for financial markets and 3) a 
propagation mechanism from the financial to the real economy.  
 
Analysis of financial crises suggests two key initial causal factors: financial 
liberalization and credit expansion.  For example Bordo et al. (2001) find that in the post 
WWII period, financial crises occur more frequently after financial deregulation and 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2008a, 2008b, 2009) using a data set of high and middle-to-low 
income countries, find that systemic banking crises are usually preceded by credit booms 
and asset price bubbles. Also, Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) compare financial crises in 
20 countries: 5 industrial and 15 emerging economies. They find that financial 
liberalization and significant credit expansion precede most of crises in their sample with 
a resulting average increase in the price of stocks of about 40 percent per year above that 
occurring in normal times. The prices of real estate and other assets also increase 
significantly. Eventually the stock and real estate markets collapse. In many cases banks 
and other intermediaries were overexposed to the equity and real estate markets and 
about a year later on average a banking crisis ensues. Finally, a significant decrease in 
output occurs with a recession that lasts about a year and a half on average.  
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Hence research suggests financial liberalization plus credit expansion results 
initially in an increase in asset prices which may eventually cause a financial crisis 
provided an asset price bubble and bust cycle occurs. The price bubble can develop in 
either stocks or real estate or both.  
 
Ideas about how asset price bubbles and busts occur are developed by Minsky 
(1986),  Akerlof and Shiller (2009) and Geanakoplos (2009). Minsky proposes a credit 
cycle model of five stages: displacement, boom, euphoria, profit taking and panic. The 
displacement stage could occur due to financial liberalization and credit expansion 
resulting in an asset price bubble, i.e. Minsky’s “euphoria”. An asset price bubble occurs 
when an increase in asset prices causes an increase in expected future asset prices. This 
results in increased current demand for assets which results in further increases in prices 
and demand and so in a spiral that drives asset prices up. The boom or bubble is sustained 
so long as new buyers are available who have access to credit and who also believe asset 
prices will continue to rise.  
 
Akerlof and Shiller (2009) suggest that during a bubble, beliefs that assets prices 
will continue to rise, spreads like an epidemic from one investor to another. 
Geanakoplos’ (2009) model of leverage cycles suggests a link between asset prices, 
credit availability, and optimistic expectations: A rise in asset prices increases the value 
of assets as collateral. This makes banks more willing to lend, which further increases the 
demand for assets, particularly for the most optimistic borrowers. Increased demand for 
assets further increases asset prices and the asset price spiral continues. At some point all 
so inclined buyers have brought into the market, asset prices peak and the asset price 
bubble pops. For Minsky this is the “panic stage”. For Geanakoplos this is an example of 
“scary news” which causes a sudden selling of assets resulting in falling asset prices. The 
decline in the wealth of leveraged buyers resulting in forced sales and a further 
downward spiral in asset prices. In addition in this environment banks tighten lending 
standards due to increased uncertainty and disagreement about the future. A similar idea 
was developed earlier by Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) who show that small shocks can 
result in large effects because of the role of collateral. A shock that lowers asset prices 
lowers the value of collateral. This means that less borrowing is possible, asset prices are 
further lowered and so on in a downward spiral. 
 
The propagation of a bust in asset prices to the real economy depends on the 
involvement of the financial sector in financing the bubble. More financial sector 
involvement implies greater hits to financial institution balance sheets. This increases the 
uncertainty about lenders to bank have about bank solvency. Consequently depositors and 
other lenders to financial institutions start to withdraw their funds or refuse to rollover 
debt. This forces financial institutions to sell assets. The consequence is a downward 
spiral in asset prices and/or a freeze up in financial market, resulting in a decline in the  
actual or due to asymmetric information, perceived number of secure banks and financial 
institutions .  
 
Central bank and government interventions are common events during financial 
crises.  They prevent the bankruptcy of systemic financial institutions and prevent 
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contagion. In March 2008, for example, the Federal Reserve used this argument to try to 
avoid the bankruptcy of Bear Sterns which occurred a few months later in September of 
2008 and illustrates how damaging contagion can be. The process did not work as it was 
expected by the academic literature and was not accounted for in the decision of the 
Federal Reserve and Treasure that Lehman should not be saved. After seeing Lehman 
Brothers collapse, confidence in the creditworthiness of banks and other financial 
institutions and firms fell significantly contaminating then the real economy and resulting 
in a damaging effect. 
 
Another effect of financial distress in the banking system is reduced lending to the 
real economy. Generally, sectors that are more dependent on external finance perform 
relatively worse during banking crises, provide evidence that bank distress contributes to 
a decline in credit and to low GDP growth, especially in developing countries and 
countries with less access to foreign finance where the effects are stronger.  These results 
are consistent with the financial accelerator model of  Bernanke and Gertler (1989) which 
provides a useful framework for thinking about the impact of tighter lending standards on 
the real economy. These authors argue that due to differences in the cost to lenders in 
borrowing from banks versus the bond market, credit market conditions can amplify and 
propagate shocks if borrowers lose bank financing or if a negative shock to the 
borrowers’ wealth results in a loss of access to bank credit.  Hence a financial crisis due 
to financial disintermediation can have a large negative impact on the real economy.               
 
3.  THE FINANCIAL CRISIS OF 2007-09  
The financial crisis of 2007-09 shares many of the characteristics of previous 
crises while some of the details differ. Similar to past crises, Buiter (2007) cites credit 
expansion in the form of excessive global liquidity creation by key central banks and a 
global saving glut, brought about by the entry of a number of high-saving countries 
(notably China) into the global economy and a global redistribution of wealth and income 
towards commodity exporters that also had, at least in the short run, high propensities to 
save. Finally some of the unique characteristics of the crisis include fundamental flaws in 
the rating agencies’ business model, pro-cyclical behavior of leverage in much of the 
financial system, and privately rational but socially inefficient disintermediation.  
       
A detailed overview of the events preceding and during the current financial crisis 
is provided in Adrian and Shin (2009), Brunnermeier (2009) and Taylor (2008). These 
authors argue that the beginning of the current financial crisis can be related to the low 
interest rate policies adopted by the Federal Reserve and other central banks in the G20s 
after the collapse of the technology stock bubble in 2001. A contributing factor was the 
global savings surplus of rapidly growing Asian nations. The combination of the global 
savings glut and the easy monetary policy by the Fed to offset the bursting of the internet 
bubble contributed to a dramatic increase in the demand for housing. As in the case with 
previous bubbles, rising housing prices led to increased demand for housing resulting in 
further increases in prices, thus setting off a rising price spiral with prices increasing 
significantly during 2004-2006 in the U.S. and several other countries. After this bubble 
reached its peak in July 2006, house prices in the U.S. and elsewhere started to fall in 
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early 2007. As a consequence, the prices of securitized subprime mortgages fell, affecting 
financial markets worldwide. 
  
In summer 2007, U.S. and the global financial markets found themselves facing a 
potential financial crisis. It was becoming clear that banks and other financial institutions 
would ultimately lose tens or even hundreds of billions of dollars from their exposure to 
subprime mortgage market loans. Bank lending is closely tied to bank capital or net 
worth.  Specifically, bank regulators require that loans do not exceed a certain multiple of 
capital. Thus, the Federal Reserve faced the danger of a sharp contraction in credit and 
bank lending in a way that threatened a recession. 
  
The subprime mortgage meltdown started in early 2007.  Bear Stearns, one of the 
nation’s largest underwriters of mortgage bonds, experienced major financial difficulties 
in the summer of 2007 in two of its High Grade Structured Credit Funds. As a benchmark 
for the 2007 U.S. sub-prime crisis, Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) draw on data from the 
eighteen bank-centered financial crises from the post-War period.  By comparing the 
run-up in housing prices prior to the financial crisis, the run-up in housing prices in the 
United States exceeds that of the major housing increases in the Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2008) sample. Once again, the United States looks like the archetypical crisis country, 
only more so. What caused such a large increase in housing prices remains to date a topic 
of intense discussion.  Taylor (2008 ) and others claim that it was the easy monetary 
policy of the Fed during 2004-2006 that fueled higher housing prices while Bernanke 
(2010) disputes such claims.   
  
From the perspective of risk taking measures, the average difference between U.S. 
government agency securities – those issued by Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and the like –
and U.S. Treasury securities of equivalent maturity is often used as an early indicator. 
Normally, the securities from government agencies are viewed as only very slightly more 
risky and less liquid than Treasury issues themselves. But again, starting in August 2007, 
the gap doubled from its typical range of 15 to 25 basis points to more than 40 basis 
points. As the crisis intensified through the fall and winter, the so-called “agency spread” 
exploded to more than 90 basis points in March 2008. The change represented a “flight to 
quality,” in which investors and financial institutions shunned everything but U.S. 
Treasury securities themselves. 
  
It would seem that the standard monetary tools – the cut in the cost of discount 
borrowing and the increase in the term of the loans announced on August 17, 2007, 
followed by cuts in the federal funds rate target starting in mid-September 2007 – should 
have addressed the problem. However, there was no return to normalcy. Moreover, the 
problems of risk and credit shortage worsened through the late fall 2007 and early winter 
2008. Thus, Fed officials began a series of less conventional actions that are not in the 
current textbook descriptions of monetary policy. These actions include reducing the 
premium on primary (discount) lending from 100 to 50 and then to 25 basis points above 
the federal funds rate target, as well as an increase in the term of the lending from 
overnight to 30 and then 90 days.  It also led to the creation of several Term Auction 
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Facilities (TAF). Thus, the recent financial crisis, naturally raises the question: What if 
anything can be done in terms of economic policy to prevent future financial instabilities? 
 
4.  ECONOMIC POLICIES TO PREVENT FINANCIAL INSTABILITIES 
The 2007-2008 financial crisis and subsequent recession suggests  that 
unregulated financial markets lead to financial crises. Further given the post WWII social 
compact which makes government responsible for dampening the impact of the business 
cycle, financial crises will induce the government to bail out those parts of the financial 
sector which are considered too big to fail or too interconnected to fail in order to dampen 
the impact of financial shocks on the real economy. This government response creates a 
moral hazard problem. There are four possible solutions: (1) break the social compact, 
i.e. get the government out of the business of attempting to stabilize the economy and 
bailing out financial institutions; (2) continue bail outs in time of crisis but do not 
increase regulation; ( 3) still bail out financial institutions in time of crisis but increase 
government regulation of financial markets and finally (4) follow an extensive public 
policy agenda in the spirit of H. Minsky.  The first solution  is a return to the pre-social 
welfare state monetary and fiscal policies of the 19
th
 century and is very unlikely to 
happen. The second solution is one that perhaps some people in the financial sector 
would be prefer but it would likely result in even bigger financial crises in the future with 
resulting bigger government budget deficits and monetary overhang potentially leading to 
a increased uncertainty, higher inflation and/or prolonged slumps. The third solution 
seems practical. Even conservative economists have said that regulation of the financial 
sector needs to be reformed. The Minsky (1986) approach and its recent reinterpretation 
by Tymoigne and Wray (2009) calls for significant government initiatives beyond just 
regulation. 
  
Looking forward a strong case can be made for changes in both monetary policy 
and financial regulation. The recent massive bailout of the U.S. financial sector has surely 
created the expectation that in the future the government will cover the bad outcome of 
any financial position taken by a too large to fail or too interconnected to fail financial 
institution. This expectation creates a moral hazard problem that must be dealt by 
financial regulation. Not to do so would imply potentially greater future financial crises 
and bailouts since managers of financial institutions under current regulations have 
incentive to take risks where bad outcomes are borne by tax payers.  
  
To avoid a repeat of the current crisis a consensus is building for a new monetary 
policy regime that combines the standard goals of price stability and maximum 
sustainable growth as laid out in the Taylor rule with micro-prudential regulation and 
macro-prudential monitoring. Suggested micro-prudential regulation typically includes 
two main parts: (1) regulation to make leverage of financial institutions counter rather 
than pro-cyclical and (2) changes in financial market executive compensation to make 
managers internalize the potential negative externality they generate by taking risks. In 
other words managers need to lose a substantial portion of their income when the trades 
they make turn out ex post to be bad. The events of the recent financial crisis suggest that  
the leverage of non-financial institutions, such as the size of real estate down payments   
needs to be regulated as well. The often suggested macro-prudential monitoring is for  
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regulators, such as the Fed, to monitor the trades of financial institutions. Many 
institutions making the same trade, i.e. the same bet, results in high systemic risk to all if 
the trade goes bad. Such monitoring could potentially lead to changes in micro-prudential 
regulation such as requiring firms to hold more capital, i.e. reduce leverage when 
financial institutions are taking a similar financial position based on similar assumptions 
(such as all betting that real estate prices will continue to rise).  However since micro 
prudential regulation informed by macro-prudential monitoring is likely to decrease the 
profitability, size and political influence of the financial sector such changes in regulation 
have met and will continue to meet substantial resistance from members of the financial 
community. The future is likely to bring more financial crises. How severe they will be 
depends on how regulation is adjusted in response to the current crisis. 
 
5.  CONCLUSIONS 
 The financial crisis of 2007-2009 has upset the view that the “Great Moderation” in 
the volatility of real GDP growth and inflation was due to financial innovations and 
appropriate monetary policy.  Ironically now many economists think that financial 
innovations and monetary policy caused the financial crisis and consequently the Great 
Recession. Hence the role of financial regulation and monetary policy plays in financial 
markets and the economy is being reconsidered. In the future monetary policy may 
respond directly to financial asset price booms and financial markets may be more tightly 
regulated. Getting the monetary and financial regulation policy mix right will be critical 
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